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Preface
Precarious statehood—the inability of a state to enforce public order
and to fulfill its international obligations—implies severe challenges
to global security. At least since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it has be-
come clear that the risks posed by weak or failing states are not lim-
ited threatening the life of their own citizens or destabilizing their
immediate neighborhood. The failure of a country to govern and con-
trol its territory jeopardizes security on a global scale. Such state
weakness or failure often abets the emergence of lawless zones,
which provide safe haven for international terrorism and organized
crime. Just recently, the mounting danger of piracy attacks off the
coast of Somalia underscored the international security implications
emanating from precarious states.
Over the last ten years, there has been a growing awareness of the
threats posed by precarious statehood and the international commun-
ity has had to admit that its existing policy approaches do not suffice.
In the face of the multidimensional and interdependent challenges
that precarious states pose, some very basic questions have arisen:
Whom should diplomacy address if there is no government present
with which the international community could negotiate? What can
development policy achieve if its projects within a precarious state fall
victim to a hostile security environment repeatedly? And what pur-
pose is served by military intervention if it succeeds in winning a war
but fails to establish peace?
In suggesting answers to these questions, policy-makers and sci-
entists in the West have become convinced that foreign-policy-related
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instruments need to be realigned and a whole-of-government ap-
proach needs to be implemented in order to deal successfully with
precarious states. This means relinquishing the existing division be-
tween diplomacy, development and defense in favor of a comprehen-
sive approach that coordinates and combines civilian and military pol-
icy tools.
This book is an attempt to assess the extent to which both interna-
tional organizations and states have lived up to the new insights of
the “3D”-continuum and adopted strategies corresponding institu-
tional settings and policy instruments to provide the necessary cul-
ture of policy coherence for tackling the problem of precarious state-
hood. On the national level, the cases studied are the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. All four coun-
tries have been, and still are, involved in peacebuilding and recon-
struction in precarious states, albeit to different degrees. On the inter-
national level, the United Nations and the European Union were the
obvious choices for a close scrutiny.
Hopefully, the lessons learned from whole-of-government ap-
proaches and the recommendations drawn from this survey will help
both governments and international organizations to excel in dealing
with weak and failing states, thereby making policy coherence a real-
ity in risk assessment, decision-making and policy implementation.
It was a pleasure for the Bertelsmann Stiftung to work with so
many outstanding experts during the project and we are most grate-
ful for the dedication with which the authors of these case studies
have supported this project. We are indebted to Reinhard Rummel of
the SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) for
serving as commentator, especially for the chapter on the European
Union. Special thanks are due to the two co-editors, Wim van Meurs
and Hans-Joachim Spanger, for their advice and encouragement.
Stefani Weiss
Director
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels Office
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Precarious States Strategies:
Toward a Culture of Coherence
Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, Wim van Meurs
The end of the Cold War radically changed both classic policies of na-
tional and collective security and international strategies for conflict
management and the stabilization of precarious states. Initially, opti-
mistic expectations of a peace dividend from defense budgets coin-
cided with enhanced ambitions to move beyond “containment” and
invest in sustainable solutions to protracted inter- and intrastate con-
flicts. The threat of Islamic extremism and the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq have shattered any illusions of a peace dividend, redefined
the parameters of national security and given strategies against state
failure a new urgency.
The growing awareness of the complex and intertwined problems
of human security, socioeconomic underdevelopment and gover-
nance deficits as root causes of precarious statehood made policy co-
herence the new mantra for Western national governments and inter-
national organizations. “3D coherence” requires institutions that
once largely acted autonomously—defense, diplomacy and develop-
ment—to exchange information, share resources and cooperate in
strategy development and implementation. Meanwhile, it has become
a truism that civil and military crisis management do not go together
easily and that ill-construed development or humanitarian aid in an
escalating conflict risks counterproductive side effects. Both the tim-
ing of initial 3D coherence endeavors and their results varied for each
national government and international organizations, depending on
institutional architecture and political culture as much as on the ac-
tual challenges in the field. The present study compares the institu-
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tional implementation of the coherence agenda by four national gov-
ernments—the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands—as well as by two international organizations—the
United Nations and the European Union.
The problem of precarious states and international interventions
Foreign governments’ efforts to give the newly created states of the post-
colonial era a lease on life, or to reconstruct war-torn states and societies,
are old and new at the same time. For several decades, these efforts have
been the business of diplomatic mediation, development assistance and
military intervention, with the anti- as well as post-colonial wars of the
1960s and 1970s in Africa providing the most pertinent examples. How-
ever, much as the Cold War for most of the postwar period had spoiled
any thought of a uniform approach by the international community,
initially a need for harmonized and coordinated activities by relevant
government agencies was scarcely recognized, in part because the rel-
evant institutions, procedures and concepts were not yet in place.
Thus, military involvement either meant fighting a war, as in the
cases of Vietnam and Afghanistan, or was confined to mere peace-
keeping under UN auspices: third-party intervention (often, but not
always, by military forces) to separate the fighting parties and keep
them apart. Peacebuilding—that is, the long-term process of capacity-
building, reconciliation, and societal transformation after violent con-
flict—was not yet on the agenda. The German Bundeswehr’s opera-
tions were even more restricted. Up until the first comprehensive
missions at the beginning of the 1990s (UNTAC in Cambodia 1992–
1993 and UNOSOM II in Somalia 1993–1994), German armed forces
were engaged globally in scope yet on a rather limited scale, with mis-
sions confined to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Similarly, development assistance needed time to establish itself
as a conceptually and institutionally distinct government activity,
based on the assumption that development as an inevitably long-term
venture required dialogue and partnership with the recipients in or-
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der to properly identify local needs. This widely shared premise never-
theless led to quite different institutional results. Whereas in Ger-
many, for instance, a separate Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development was established, the American agency USAID
made it only to a branch within the State Department, and in the UK
the development agency frequently changed its status in line with
government composition. The repercussions on political decision-
making varied correspondingly.
Conceptually, another paradigm shift occurred within the interna-
tional development community in addressing the issue of gover-
nance. The popularity of the “developmental state” as the engine of
growth in the 1960s and 1970s was followed by a trend away from the
state when, in the 1980s, the efforts at “structural adjustment” set in.
Toward the end of that decade, mitigating calls for “good governance”
complemented these trends, thereby again giving greater weight to
state institutions and their proper functioning. With the end of com-
munism, propelled by the third wave of democratization, however,
the focus shifted back to civil society. In the 1990s, this trend was ac-
companied by an emphasis on rewarding “good performers”—coun-
tries with relatively effective governments and sound macroeconomic
policies—and a neglect of those “weak performers” that, almost by
definition, were the ones most in need of aid and that originally gave
birth to the notion of development assistance.
The peculiarities of engaging precarious states
As an additional layer, concurrent with and encouraged by the end of
the Cold War, dysfunctions of the state came to the fore. These have
since gained prominence in world politics not only as a developmen-
tal but even more as a strategic challenge. One challenge has evolved
around atrocities committed by states, as for instance in the case of
Kosovo, encouraged by the concept of “human security.”1 This engen-
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1 See, for instance, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 2004.
dered efforts to create a new international consensus around the right
to intervene when states are not willing to protect their own citizens,
and it has evolved toward a “responsibility to protect.”2 The second
originated at the opposite end of the spectrum, with states not able to
protect their citizens because of their inherent weakness or even col-
lapse, Somalia and Afghanistan being cases in point. State collapse
too entails large-scale human suffering and has serious repercussions
for regional and, as turned out at a more advanced stage, even global
security. Initially, this new phenomenon did not attract much atten-
tion; the Hart-Rudman Commission on US National Security back in
2000 was among the first to have ranked the “spreading phenomena
of weak and failed states” among the primary “disruptive new
forces.”3 Only in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 (9/11) was this
widely recognized as “the leading menace on the globe.”4
Both variants of precarious statehood have not only called into
question the legal foundations of the international system of states
and the viability of states as an organizing principle of social life; they
have also given rise to frequent calls for broad-scale intervention by
the international community. Three basic justifications have been put
forward: first, on ethical grounds, to end the suffering of people
whose states do not perform their duties. Second is the development
argument that those states cannot act as reliable partners in develop-
ment cooperation. Third are security arguments that have been put
forward in the narrow sense of the “war on terrorism” but also in the
broader sense contained in the report of the UN Secretary-General’s
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, which goes be-
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2 As conceived by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty, Ottawa (International Development Research Centre), December 2001, and
as stated by the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Changes: A More Secure World 2004.
3 For the full text of the document, released on 15 April, 2000, see www.nssg.gov.
4 Crocker 2003: 43. See also the “National Security Strategy of the United States of
America,” 17 September 2002, which warns in the president’s introductory letter
that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national inter-
ests as strong states.”
yond traditional concerns and includes, among threats to national and
international security, “poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible
use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terror-
ism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-
State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State
security” (A More Secure World 2004: 11).
Precarious statehood, though mostly located in the developing
world, has been perceived as a challenge of a fundamentally different
nature, with unique features that require new policy responses and
approaches. The way that development, security and diplomatic in-
struments were used proved insufficient to reach the common goal:
stabilizing and rehabilitating these countries. Whereas traditional de-
velopment assistance is long-term and aims at gradual change, failed
states are in need of both quick fixes to remedy the impact of failure
and sustained efforts to address the root causes of failure. The former
points to the immediate steps to be taken, namely reconstructing the
basics of statehood and providing basic services, ordinarily with a
strong security component; the latter points to the building blocks of
stable statehood.
This requires combined efforts, coordinated activities and harmon-
ized approaches within and among the relevant government agencies
and international organizations. Many of these, including the UN,
the OECD and the World Bank, as well as most donor countries, have
developed conceptual thinking and practical approaches to engage-
ment in precarious states. These unanimously stress peace-building
and state-building as fundamental to development, focus interna-
tional engagement on helping to build legitimate, effective and resil-
ient state institutions, and emphasize the need for joined-up and co-
herent action within and among governments and organizations.
The concept of “precarious,” “fragile” or “failed” states is not con-
sensual among donors and partner countries. The denominations
have been varied and encompass a number of partially overlapping
yet analytically distinct concepts regarding vulnerability: difficult aid
partners (OECD); Low Income Countries Under Stress (World Bank);
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poor-performing countries or weak performers (Asian Development
Bank); fragile, failing or failed states (United States); countries at risk
of instability (United Kingdom)—to name but a few. Accordingly, a
large number of strategies have been issued with, however, only lim-
ited variance: The World Bank issued several papers on fragile states;
USAID approved a strategy for fragile states; the African Develop-
ment Bank in November 2006 issued a Proposal for Enhancing Bank
Group Assistance to Fragile States in Africa; and the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC 2007a) approved the Princi-
ples for International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the
most comprehensive approach to date. The main challenges posed by
precarious states to donors’ engagement can be derived from these
principles.
Security and development: It is widely recognized that security and
development are interlinked: Security is a precondition for develop-
ment, and security will not be sustained without a minimum level of
development. Beyond the immediate security concerns, the DAC
principles therefore maintain that international engagement in preca-
rious states “will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on
building the relationship between state and society, through engage-
ment in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and account-
ability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance,
human rights, civil-society engagement and peace building. Secondly,
strengthening the capability of states to fulfill their core functions is
essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensur-
ing security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling
environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance
and employment generation” (ibid.: 2).
Short-term and long-term needs: Precarious states harbor a peculiar
combination of short-term and long-term, emergency and develop-
ment needs that have to be addressed jointly. A rigid delineation be-
tween humanitarian and development actions, and between conflict
and post-conflict phases, is inadequate. Moreover, quick-fix palliatives
to long-term issues will not work. Additionally, when donors engage
in fragile situations, they often establish parallel systems because gov-
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ernment systems are weak. A particular issue here is the potential
gaps in service delivery. This is also reflected in the DAC principles,
which call on civil society to “play a critical transitional role in provid-
ing basic services, particularly when the government lacks will and/or
capacity.” However, such an approach can undermine capacity and
state-building goals and therefore entails a delicate balancing act to
which DAC also points: “Where possible, international actors should
seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-build-
ing, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition
mechanisms. It is important to identify functioning systems within
existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these” (ibid.: 3).
Flexible engagement: On the one hand, assistance to precarious
states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of oppor-
tunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. On the
other, the DAC principles caution that “given low capacity and the ex-
tent of the challenges facing those states, international engagement
may need to be of longer duration than in other low-income coun-
tries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require
an engagement of at least ten years” (ibid.: 3) and improved aid pre-
dictability is considered of particular importance in these environ-
ments. Moreover, the specific needs of fragile states have shifted de-
velopment actions to areas such as state-building, conflict prevention
activities or reconciliation initiatives, which require a long-term en-
gagement, not always with identifiable or quantifiable measures of
success and impact that donors often adhere to for reasons of ac-
countability, quantitative performance criteria and results assess-
ments. And not least, the donors’ tendency to allocate huge amounts
of aid in the short term following the end of a violent conflict, and to
pull out in the medium term when absorption levels are increasing,
is highly counterproductive.
Regional context: In cases of sub-national fragility (e.g., Darfur), or
where cross-border issues are critical (e.g., the Great Lakes region),
engagement needs to be sufficiently flexible to move to these levels,
which poses organizational challenges for donors accustomed to work-
ing within the nation-state framework. Regional approaches are essen-
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tial to address specific issues, such as drug trafficking, crime, rebel
alliances, refugee flows, illegal exploitation of resources and others.
No blueprint: Although the mutually reinforcing nature of poverty
and governance failure is common to all precarious states, each con-
text is different, which presents difficult policy challenges. Thus,
countries are usually on different security and development trajecto-
ries that require different mixes of security and development policies
specific to their needs, while international actors rely upon a standard
set of policy tools that are not necessarily compatible. In this regard,
the DAC principles stress that “[s]ound political analysis is needed to
adapt international responses to country context, beyond quantitative
indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. Interna-
tional actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments accord-
ing to context, and avoid blueprint approaches” (ibid.: 1).
The whole-of-government agenda
As has been outlined above, the challenges faced by precarious states
are multidimensional and interdependent. Humanitarian aid, peace-
keeping and peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, curbing
small arms proliferation, antiterrorist activities, fighting organized
crime, alleviating poverty, reinforcing state institutions and promot-
ing good governance, service delivery, containing diseases—all are si-
multaneously on a pressing agenda. As a rule, tensions and tradeoffs
arise, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on the four
core elements: upstream analysis, joint assessments, shared strat-
egies, and coordination of political engagement. This underlines the
need for international actors to set clear priorities and objectives. To
make it operational, within donor governments a whole-of-govern-
ment approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, po-
litical and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for develop-
ment aid and humanitarian assistance.
Coordination and harmonization are therefore central, given the
problems that uncoordinated and incoherent interventions can pose
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in exacerbating tensions or undermining state-building efforts. Four
levels of policy coordination may be distinguished: (a) intraministe-
rial, which calls for coordination of all relevant programs targeting a
given country within each donor ministry; (b) whole-of-government,
which highlights coordination across relevant ministries; (c) inter-
donor, which refers to coordination among aid agencies and between
aid and non-aid approaches across donors; and (d) donor-partner,
which calls for alignment between donors and the partner countries’
needs and priorities.
The basic aim is to align the two distinct approaches that currently
dominate responses to precarious states, each driven by different mo-
tivations and policy recommendations: (a) security concerns and
short-term responses that focus on national security issues and aim
at achieving immediate stability; and (b) development concerns and
long-term assistance that emphasizes the significant challenges
posed by precarious states to alleviate poverty and achieve the Millen-
nium Development Goals. If these are not pursued in conjunction,
the pursuit of one can easily undermine the efforts of the other, as
demonstrated in Afghanistan, where the collateral damage of fighting
terrorism and organized crime has severely undermined trust among
the Afghan population toward ISAF and the new Afghan govern-
ment.
The need for coordination and coherence has been widely recog-
nized and has found expression in operational guidelines on the part
of the military as well as the development agencies. The DAC princi-
ples as well as the OECD Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)
initiative and the OECD Joint Learning and Advisory Process on Diffi-
cult Partnerships are cases in point on the part of development
agents. The DAC principles not only call for whole-of-government ap-
proaches to foster close collaboration across the economic, develop-
ment, diplomatic and security fields. They also focus on the organiza-
tional levels, where donors will have to create internal capacity to
assess state fragility, respond quickly to volatile environments, build
an adequate local presence and attract skilled staff to work in these
countries. Not least with a view to crisis prevention, the aims are
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“sharing risk analyzes; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address
the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities,
especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; support-
ing the peace-building capabilities of regional organizations, and
undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises”
(OECD-DAC 2007b: 16). The OECD activities mainly address aid-re-
lated issues, such as its effectiveness, coordination among donors
and actors at all levels, programming flexibility and aid impact. Never-
theless, notable progress has also been made toward harmonizing
and aligning donor actions by enhancing coordination between devel-
opment agencies and security forces operating in the same area. De-
velopment alone cannot succeed in stabilizing a failed state, any
more than military intervention can rebuild destroyed political infra-
structure. Therefore, this approach intends to promote policy coher-
ence within the administration of each international actor.
On the military side, the notable example is NATO’s Civil Military
Cooperation (CIMIC), which came about in the wake of the SFOR
mission in Bosnia and is reflected in its basic document, MC 411/1.
This defines CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support
of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, in-
cluding national population and local authorities, as well as interna-
tional, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies”
(NATO 2001). Applied to both Collective Defense Operations and
non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, it aims at delineating re-
spective responsibilities. Thus, CIMIC confirms that “normally” the
military will “only be responsible for security-related tasks and for
support to the appropriate civil authority.” In the “exceptional circum-
stances” of a failed state, however, it is ready “to take on tasks nor-
mally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organization or
agency. These tasks will only be taken on where the appropriate civil
body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate and where
an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise.” Recognizing the
need for “integrated planning and close working level relationships
between the military and appropriate civil organizations and agencies
before and during a military deployment” both “in theatre and at Stra-
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tegic Command level or below,” CIMIC equally stresses the impor-
tance of “identifying and sharing common goals” at an early stage
and calls for transparency in order to avoid the risk of tensions within
the civil-military relationship that would be detrimental to the overall
goal.
The inherent tensions between the imperatives of military opera-
tions and development activities have been mentioned above. Yet ten-
sions also arise because military personnel often act as development
assistants in those environments—repairing buildings, digging wells,
clearing roads, facilitating the return of refugees, or even improving
local education—but the military refuses to be considered part of de-
velopment assistance.
From ideals to implementation: institutionalizing policy coherence
Combining short-term stabilization and long-term transformation,
whole-of-government approaches demand high levels of coordination
for an extended period of time. But this has proven very difficult to
achieve. The reasons are manifold. Within donor countries, policies
are usually generated separately by ministries, each having different
organizational cultures, goals, languages, methods and approaches.
The cultural and institutional differences between security/military
and development institutions are particularly great. There is discrep-
ancy of mandates and variance in time horizons and missions’ frame-
works. Thus, military and security interventions tend to focus on
short-term actions and limited timeframes, while development is re-
garded as a long-term venture. Many times, donors also support proj-
ects that do not add up to support a coherent strategy. The same hap-
pens between departments or bodies in multilateral agencies. In
many cases, this has led to incoherence at the strategic level, for in-
stance between arms exports and conflict resolution efforts, or be-
tween trade and development objectives. And not least, the suspicion
with which parts of the development and security community regard
each other is still a stumbling block.
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Therefore, it has been widely noticed that so far only little prog-
ress has been made toward proper integration and coherence of mili-
tary and development objectives and methods within donors’ strat-
egies and actions. There still appears to be a disconnect between the
policy rhetoric about integrated approaches at the international level
and policy realities at the national and field levels.
In this book, our basic aim is to identify best practices and, on
that foundation, to elaborate recommendations for improving the
overall record of addressing precarious statehood by joined-up gov-
ernment efforts. This requires first taking stock of strategic concepts
and institutional arrangements and then turning to the gap between
declaration, operational guidelines and implementation. As case stud-
ies, we selected four donor countries, largely for pragmatic reasons.
The UK’s whole-of-government and pooling approaches are widely
perceived—not only by analysts, but also by political strategists
searching for a blueprint—as the prototype of successful policy coher-
ence. Conversely, most EU governments tend to contrast their strate-
gic approach to weak or failed statehood with the US strategy and its
propensity for military fixes. Correspondingly, in Europe the Ameri-
can process toward policy coherence is largely perceived as a contras-
tive model. The Netherlands represents a less well known concept of
policy coherence, modeled along the lines of the British example, that
has received ample praise from experts. With the more cautious and
incremental 2004 Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict
Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” Germany has become a
role model in its own right. We included two international organiza-
tions in the case studies not only because they are deeply involved in
the crisis management of failed states, but also because they add an
important element to the need for international coordination. These
are the EU, which is the international organization with the most ela-
borated institutional framework, and the United Nations, where inter-
national coordination has to take place with active participation of the
precarious states themselves.
Each of the six case studies—four national governments (US, UK,
Germany and the Netherlands) and two international organizations
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(EU and UN)—is based on two related sets of analytical questions.
The first set concerns the agenda and the process—the orientation of
the political agenda of policy coherence and the dynamics of its insti-
tutionalization and implementation over the past decade. The second
set concerns the outcome—the net results of the process—and takes
stock of the current state of play, both institutionally and in terms of
procedures relevant for precarious-state5 strategies and cooperative
procedures for the entire conflict cycle.
The agenda and the process: The key question pertains to the emer-
gence of precarious or failed states and the related rise of policy coher-
ence on the political agenda since the end of the Cold War, identifying
the structural factors behind these issues and the political agents driv-
ing the agenda. Additionally, the survey addresses the position of
those driving (or obstructing) the coherence agenda in the respective
political and administrative hierarchies—not least in terms of sus-
tainability versus dependency on individual political actors and tem-
porary windows of opportunity. In the same vein, factors of political
culture and institutional setup that either facilitate or impede the
process toward enhanced policy coherence and interagency coopera-
tion are identified. The specific qualifications and terms used to de-
fine the issue—ranging from “state failure” and “peacebuilding” to
“civil-military cooperation” and “post-conflict reconstruction”—are
linked to the traditional sectoral, policy-area and geographic priorities
and preferences vis-à-vis precarious statehood as well as their impact
on the coherence process.
Institutions and procedures: An equally relevant question concerns
the (level of) institutionalization of precarious-state issues and how
policy coherence is represented in the current institutional arrange-
ments. The report focuses on new procedures and agencies to en-
hance coherence in policies, objectives, engagement criteria and divi-
sions of labor consolidated in (joined) strategy documents. More
specifically, new agencies or mechanisms are analyzed with special
21
5 “Precarious statehood” is used throughout as a generic term for the state of a polity
referred to in academic studies and policy reports as “failed,” “failing,” “fragile,” “at
risk” or “weak.”
attention, on the one hand, for the political-hierarchical status of rep-
resentatives commissioned to a coordinating agency and, on the
other hand, for the existence of public outreach and the availability of
entry points for civil-society organizations. The assessment of the co-
herence procedures, moreover, concerns all policy stages, ranging
from early warning and risk analysis to political agenda setting and
decision-making, as well as to directing and evaluating actual mis-
sions in the field. Evidently, key factors determining the effectiveness
of precarious-state strategies are recruitment and training of staff, ac-
cess to risk assessments and (shared) early-warning mechanisms,
and (pooling of) budgetary resources. The survey also assesses the
current priority, acceptance and momentum of the policy-coherence
agenda in each polity: Is the commitment to coherence real or largely
window-dressing? Eventually, the issue of the quality of cooperation
and coherence concerns both the intra-institutional level and joining-
up with other national, regional and international actors.
The addressees of the present study and its survey of “lessons
learned” are national governments and international organizations
that are only just broaching the issue of policy coherence, as well as
others that are developing a follow-up strategy to enhance the quality
and scope of integrated approaches to precarious statehood. The rec-
ommendations combine lessons learned concerning the drivers and
caveats in establishing the coherence agenda from the first set of
questions and the operative experiences of the various institutional ar-
rangements in specific polities from the second set. In particular, the
national case studies have been chosen to represent a broad range of
institutional preconditions in order to ensure the applicability of the
recommendations to other European polities.
In recent years, for most Western governments policy coherence
has become a widely accepted strategic objective in dealing with weak
and failing states, both within the EU-27 and in North America.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the urgency of making the obligatory
mantra of policy coherence a reality in risk assessment, decision-mak-
ing and policy implementation varies significantly from capital to
capital. Each government, moreover, has defined quite distinct achiev-
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ables based on national institutional architectures, political traditions
and strategic preferences. Despite the consensus in principle on the
desirability of policy coherence, understandings of the way to proceed
and actual progress toward the predefined targets demonstrate more
contrasts than similarities among the four selected countries (the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands).
The objective of the present section is to explain the differences in
policy objectives, institutional choices and actual progress made.
The main caveat of the comparative analysis concerns the issue of
effectiveness in terms of real, demonstrable outcome in the consoli-
dation and stabilization of precarious states in the Balkans, Africa or
Asia. Effectiveness per se is not at issue here; it becomes a factor only
if and when a government or an agency fields “ineffectiveness” or “in-
efficiency” in producing results in the target countries as an argu-
ment to champion more or a different kind of interagency policy co-
herence. A second caveat concerns international coherence and
cooperation among national governments and/or within the relevant
international organizations. These issues will be dealt with below
from the perspective of the respective intergovernmental organiza-
tion, with the United Nations and the European Union as pioneers in
policy coherence for precarious-state strategies.
National governments and policy coherence
In order to explain both the national processes toward policy coher-
ence over the past decade and the mid-2007 state of play, we have
based the present analysis on a triangle with three clusters of relevant
factors: legacies of formative experiences in weak-state policies, preex-
isting constellations of the relevant institutions, and the political
agency driving the process. The first cluster encompasses “legacies”
of past formative experiences, ranging from colonialism and decolo-
nization to 21st-century terrorism. The second, “institutional,” cluster
concerns the national political traditions and institutional architec-
ture that may or may not be conducive to cross-departmental coher-
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ence, such as the relative political weight and institutional autonomy
of the 3D ministries of defense, foreign affairs and development co-
operation, as well as the relative importance of the corresponding in-
terlocking or interblocking of ministries. The third cluster of “agency”
factors includes the drivers of the coherence agenda and their motives
as well as those of institutions and agents paying lip service to coher-
ence while obstructing the process.
Informed by this triangular taxonomy, we describe the four na-
tional trajectories toward policy coherence and the present outcomes
on the basis of the country reports and analyze them individually in
terms of political-culture legacies and institutional architectures.
Next, we draw conclusions concerning key facilitating and obstruct-
ing factors, lessons learned and best practices, identifying realistic co-
herence models for given types of national constellations.
The United States: Policy coherence and its three protagonists
In the case of the US government, the Department of Defense be-
came a major driver of a coherent failed-states strategy, following up on
President George W. Bush’s 2002 acknowledgement that the United
States is threatened by weak states rather than by conquering states.
The Department of Defense’s imprint is clearly visible in more than
one respect. The security bias has resulted in a rather narrow definition
of the object. Whereas the terms “weak,” “failing,” “fragile” or precari-
ous” statehood imply a broad range of instruments, including both hu-
manitarian aid and international policing, the standard US term “failed
states” refers to the predominance of risks for regional and interna-
tional security, a vacuum of state authority (“ungoverned spaces”) and
safe havens for terrorists. The prioritization of post-conflict stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction was clearly linked to 9/11, but the traditional
US aversion to “nation-building,” on the one hand, and the stark priori-
tization of post-conflict management over preventive strategies tackling
the root causes of precarious statehood, on the other, proved major
stumbling blocks in the process toward an integrated strategy.
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Given the sudden strategic and security relevance of precarious
and failed states after 9/11, USAID endeavored to set the agenda and
produced a number of documents on policy integration (such as the
2005 “Fragile States Strategy”) as an interdepartmental coherence ex-
ercise and a potential nucleus for a whole-of-government approach,
only to be sidelined by the State Department’s 2006 turn toward “de-
mocratization” as the new, potentially over-ambitious policy objective
and a basis for the integration of policies and resources. Since then,
USAID has lost most of its institutional autonomy and become more
closely aligned with the Department of State under a director of for-
eign assistance doubling as deputy secretary of state. His coordinat-
ing mandate within the State Department, however, remains some-
what undefined. The most powerful drive for policy coherence came
from the Pentagon, triggered by 9/11 but exacerbated by the subse-
quent quagmire of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus,
three key players contended for control over an ambiguous policy-co-
herence agenda after influential senators had forced the issue upon
the administration in 2003–2004. Typically, the conflicting strategic
outlooks, policy priorities (security vs. poverty reduction, democratiza-
tion vs. governance) and taboos (e.g., nation-building for the Depart-
ment of Defense) of the three leading agencies effectively forestalled
progress toward real coordination and cooperation.
The constraints on the power of the Director of Foreign Assistance
and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabiliza-
tion (S/CRS) founded in 2004 as the potential key player in policy co-
ordination (both of these at the State Department) have downscaled
the net results of the institutional innovation. The lack of strong-
handed support from the White House for civilian post-conflict man-
agement created an atmosphere around the potentially dominant
newcomer permeated by backtracking and obstruction by the estab-
lished institutions. The S/CRS was to be responsible for all strategiz-
ing, coordination, deployment and monitoring for civilian involve-
ment in coordination with the US military. By 2006, the mandate of
the underfunded and understaffed agency had been scaled down to
civilian capacity-building and deployment. In terms of staffing and re-
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sources, the Pentagon is clearly the dominant player in integrated poli-
cies for precarious states, and it increasingly considers civilian post-
conflict operations part of its mandate.
As a consequence, comprehensive strategies and cross-agency co-
operation only emerge on an ad-hoc and country-by-country basis for
high-profile crises of state failure and violent conflict. Despite the tra-
ditional priority-setting and coordinating mandate of the National Se-
curity Council, in Washington the policy-coherence agenda is blocked
by the standoff of at least three aspiring lead organizations: the Pen-
tagon, the State Department and USAID. Thus, each driver of pol-
icy coherence maintains its own early-warning mechanisms, and the
S/CRS lacks additional pooled resources as a catalyst for concerted
preventive action. Both the recent exceptional experiences in intense
interagency cooperation in Washington and innovative modes of co-
operation in the field in Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g., Provincial Recon-
struction Teams) have failed to translate into a broader strategic vision
and operational routines for precarious states as such or to erode in-
teragency barriers in the US administration. In sum, despite the de-
monstrable urgency of enhanced coherence from the experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq, no qualitative progress beyond political rhet-
oric is to be expected before the new US president takes office.
The United Kingdom: Policy coherence as the prime minister’s recipe
In Europe, Tony Blair’s Labor government took the lead in developing
a coherent institutional and procedural arrangement for dealing with
precarious statehood. Political culture, partly drawing on a recent
past as a global power and colonial empire, goes a long way in ex-
plaining Britain’s vanguard attitude; public opinion and most politi-
cians expect Britain to take the lead and get actively involved in major
crises. After the end of the Cold War, this attitude got the British gov-
ernment involved in a whole range of precarious states throughout
the world, especially in sub-Sahara Africa and the Balkans—provid-
ing tragic, but formative, experience with state failure. A broad con-
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sensus in favor of a more coherent, proactive and long-term strategy
existed across party lines. The 1997 Blair administration even made
policy coherence vis-à-vis precarious states and related conflicts a
high-profile priority (as well as a recipe for several other complex pol-
icy areas) and was ready to face the political risks involved. This trend
evolved quite separately from the counterterrorism surge following
9/11: Antiterrorism made the trend more pronounced, but it was not
the initial trigger of policy coherence.
In one corner of the 3D triangle, the prominent and transparent
Security and Defense Review of the late 1990s underlined the added
value of conflict prevention and post-conflict state-building. At the
other end, the Department for International Development (DFID)
again became a ministry in its own right with ample human and fi-
nancial resources, separated from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO). Thereafter, DFID and the minister responsible have
taken on a leading role, driving the coherence agenda and appealing
to the other agencies by emphasizing the unique competencies and
resources of each partner in a successful precarious-state strategy in
the 2000 DFID review “The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
With the prime minister’s backing, DFID set out to consolidate the
well-established programs for development in conflict-prone regions,
eager to live up to its leading role in strategy development and policy
making in the relevant international organizations. At the same time,
the new 1997 Labor government pushed for an integration of the de-
velopment-driven agenda with the manifold UK participation in
peace missions, partly as an alternative to the US Department of De-
fense model. In contrast to the increased funding for DFID, tight
budgetary constraints constituted a major incentive for the MoD to
seek interdepartmental cooperation and burden sharing. Last, but not
least, joined-up government constituted a major mantra for the Blair
administration as a whole, not only for precarious-state strategies.
Thus, the major push for reforms and for the corresponding policy
documents was initiated before the UK got involved in the American
war on terror, without transforming the strategies for precarious
states and policy coherence.
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